BYU Law Review
Volume 1977 | Issue 1

Article 3

3-1-1977

Civil Rights-Religious Discrimination in
Employment- Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
Requires Reasonable Accommodation of
Employee Religious Beliefs by Employer Despite
Conflicting Lawful Agency Shop ProvisionCooper v. General Dynamics
Bradley R. Jardine

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
Recommended Citation
Bradley R. Jardine, Civil Rights-Religious Discrimination in Employment- Title VII of the Civil Rights Act Requires Reasonable
Accommodation of Employee Religious Beliefs by Employer Despite Conflicting Lawful Agency Shop Provision-Cooper v. General Dynamics,
1977 BYU L. Rev. 152 (1977).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1977/iss1/3

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

CASE NOTES
Civil Rights-RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT-TITLE
VII oF THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT REQUIRES REASONABLE AccoMMODATION OF EMPLOYEE RELIGIOUS BELIEF BY EMPLOYER DESPITE CoNFLICTING LAWFUL AGENCY SHOP PROVISION-Cooper v. General
Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed sub
nom. Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Hopkins, 45 U.S.L.W.
3314 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1976) (No. 76-537).
In 1972, General Dynamics and the International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Local No. 776
(the union), incorporated an agency shop provision into their
collective bargaining agreement.• Plaintiff employees, all
Seventh-day Adventists, objected on religious grounds to therequirement of financially supporting the union. 2 Under threat of
discharge for their refusal to pay union dues, they brought an
action against their employer and the union for injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs contended that General Dynamics and the union had
discriminated against them because of their religion in violation
of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (title VII). 3 The defendants took the position that the agency shop provision contained
in the collective bargaining agreement was authorized under the
1. An "agency shop" is a union security agreement that does not obligate an employee to become a member of a labor union or to participate in any union activities but
only requires that he .pay an agency fee, usually the equivalent of union dues, in return
for the collective bargaining services that the union renders on behalf of the employees.
Cooper v. General Dynamics, 378 F. Supp. 1258 n.1 (N.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd, 533 F.2d 163
(5th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
Hopkins, 45 U.S.L.W. 3314 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1976) (No. 76-537). "Union shops" and "closed
shops" are other types of union security agreements.
2. 378 F. Supp. at 1260. The Seventh-day Adventists, while in sympathy with the
basic goals of organized labor, such as proper wages, proper hours, and proper working
conditions, place great value upon personal liberty of conscience, believing that no person
could enjoy or exercise freedom of conscience when bound to membership in any labor
union involving men of various convictions being associated together and mutually required to adhere to policies, comply with decisions, and abide by restrictions that may
be contrary to individual conscience. It is well known that occasions arise when, failing
to obtain these objectives through the peaceful processes of negotiation, mediation, and
arbitration, measures of coercion are restored to, taking the form of boycotts, strikes,
picketings, and similar methods of enforcing their demands. Being under the scriptural
injunction as Christians that "the servant of the Lord must not strive," and that he is to
"do violence to no man," Seventh-day Adventists believe sincerely they must stand apart
from a relationship that requires participation in such procedures. Gray v. Gulf, M. &
O.R.R., 429 F.2d 1064, 1066 n.4 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 4 and therefore could be
lawfully enforced notwithstanding the plaintiffs' religious beliefs.5
The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Texas entered judgment for the defendants, finding that although plaintiffs were sincere in their religious convictions and
committed to their church's opposition to membership in, or support of, labor unions, such beliefs were "specious." In the court's
view, there was "no conflict between the plaintiffs' religious beliefs and the union security agreement. " 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed the lower court and found that plaintiffs' beliefs were
protected under section 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7
The case was remanded for a determination of whether the plaintiffs' religious beliefs could be reasonably accommodated by the
employer and the union without undue hardship to either. 8
l.
A.

BACKGROUND

History of the Conflict

The conflict between the free exercise of religion and labor's
right to organize and establish union security provisions originated soon after Congress amended the Railway Labor Act in
1951. 9 The constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act provision
that authorized union shops 10 was quickly challenged 11 in Otten
4. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970).
5. Brief for Appellees, Machinists District Lodge 776 at 9-29; Brief for Appellee,
General Dynamics at 4-5.
6. 378 F. Supp. at 1262.
7. 533 F .2d at 167-69. "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to
reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance
or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." Civil
Rights Act of 1964 § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975).
8. 533 F.2d at 165.
9. Pub. L. No. 914, ch. 1220, 64 Stat. 1238 (1951).
10. The union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act provides:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, . . . any carrier or carriers
. . . and a labor organization or labor organizations duly designated and authorized to represent employees . . . shall be permitted~
(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that . . . all employees shall become members of the labor organization
representing their craft or class . . . .
(b) to make agreements providing for the deduction by such carrier or
carriers from the wages of its or their employees in a craft or class and payment
to the labor organization representing the craft or class of such employees, or
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v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 12 where a railroad employee
brought an action to enjoin the railroad from discharging him on
grounds of his refusal to join the union because of his religious
beliefs. 13 Affirming the denial of injunction relief, Judge Learned
Hand, writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, recognized that conflict between religious principles and labor policies was inevitable. Although not explicit in
the opinion, it appears that Judge Hand found that giving unions
additional bargaining power by means of the union shop outweighed the need to protect plaintiff's conscientious "idiosyncrasies.''14
The Supreme Court later reiterated the validity of the Railway Labor Act's union shop provision in Railway Employee's
Department AFL v. Hanson. 15 There, the Court recognized that
the aim of the legislation requiring uniform union membership
was to enhance peaceful labor relations and to require a fair sharing of the costs of collective bargaining by those who benefited
therefrom. 16 In balancing the burden upon dissenting employees'
constitutional rights of freedom of association and due process
against the benefits accruing through the union shop, the Court
stated that "[i]ndustrial peace along the arteries of commerce"
justified the legislation. 17
In International Association of Machinists v. Street, 18 however, the Supreme Court took a significant step toward recognizing individual employee rights by holding that the provision
of the Railway Labor Act making payment of union dues and
any periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments . . . uniformly required as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership . . . .
Railway Labor Act § 2 Eleventh, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (1970).
11. See Note, The "Free Exercise" Clause of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution is No Defense to a Union Shop Agreement Allowed Under the Railway
Labor Act, 8 Hous. L. REv. 387 (1970).
12. 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953).
13. ld.
14. Judge Hand stated:
The First Amendment protects one against action by the government, though
even then, not in all circumstances; but it gives no one the right to insist that
in the pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his
own religious necessities . . . . We must accommodate our idiosyncrasies, religious as well as secular, to the compromises necessary in communal life . . . .
ld. at 61 (footnote omitted); accord, Wicks v. Southern Pac. Co., 231 F.2d 130 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 946 (1956).
15. 351 u.s. 225 (1956).
16. ld. at 231; see 96 CONG. REc. 16,279 (1950) (remarks of Sen. Hill).
17. 351 U.S. at 233.
18. 367 u.s. 740 (1961).
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fees mandatory was not absolute. Street, a union member,
brought an action in Georgia state court alleging that the money
he was compelled to pay to the union in order to retain his job
was being used in substantial part to finance the political campaigns of candidates whom he opposed for federal and state offices and "to promote the propagation of political and economic
doctrines, concepts and ideologies with which he disagreed." 19
The Supreme Court found that the mandatory union dues and
fees provision of the Railway Labor Act did not authorize the
union to make such use of the funds exacted from employees. 20
While the Court upheld the mandatory dues requirement, it prohibited the union from spending an employee's involuntary contributions for political causes that he opposed. 21
Subsequent cases of alleged religious discrimination 22 generally followed the Supreme Court's holding in Hanson 23 that the
requirement of financial support of the collective bargaining
agency by all who received the benefits was within the power of
Congress and did not violate the first amendment. 24 In Sherbert
v. Verner, 25 however, the Supreme Court determined that in instances of first amendment infringement only a compelling state
interest could justify an "incidental burden" on the free exercise
of religion. 26 The Sabbatarian appellant in Sherbert, after having
been discharged for her refusal to work on Saturdays and having
rejected other jobs requiring Saturday work, was deemed ineligible for unemployment compensation by the South Carolina Employment Security Commission because she failed to accept
"suitable work when offered." 27 The Court found that the appellant's ineligibility for benefits stemmed directly from the practice
of her religion and that she was forced "to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order
to accept work, on the other hand." 28 Finding an absence of any
compelling state interest to justify such a choice, the Court held
19. ld. at 744.
20. ld. at 768-70.
21. ld.
22. See, e.g., Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404
u.s. 872 (1971).
23. 351 u.s. 225 (1956).
24. ld. at 238.
25. 374 u.s. 398 (1963).
26. ld. at 403.
27. I d. at 399-401.
28. ld. at 404.
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the infringement of her first amendment right to the free exercise
of religion to be unlawful. 29

B.

The Conflict Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964

In an effort to eliminate discrimination in employment, Congress enacted title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 30 Title Vll,
along with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 31
(EEOC) Regulations issued in 1966 and 1967 requiring an employer to make a reasonable effort to accomodate his employees'
religious beliefs, 32 evidenced increased governmental concern for
individual employee rights. In contrast, congressional authorization of the union shop in the private employment sector, as evidenced in the NLRA, 33 exhibited strong congressional support for
the principle of solidarity among union members. 34 Cases involving conflicting religious and labor interests brought after passage
of the EEOC Regulations and the NLRA failed to resolve the
29. !d. at 406-10. The Court stated that "in this highly sensitive constitutional area,
'[ o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give occasion for permissible
limitation."' Id. at 406 (footnote omitted).
30. Ch. 352, tit. Vll, 78 Stat. 253 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
31. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was created by the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) to deal with problems of discrimination in employment and to assist in enforcement of the provisions of title Vll. Title Vll
gives one the opportunity to obtain a legal resolution ofhis rights when the requirements
of his religion conflict with those of his job. 42 U.S. C.§§ 2000e-2, -5 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
32. The 1967 EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion provide, inter
alia:
(b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious
grounds, required by section 703(a) (1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes
an obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable accomodations to
the religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such accommodations can be made ~thout undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. Such undue hardship, for example, may exist where the employee's needed work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially
similar qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath observer.
(c) Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to
hire and employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer
has the burden of proving that an undue hardship renders the required accomodations to the religious needs of the employee unreasonable.
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1975). Confusion about the scope of the accomodation requirement
exists in part due to the apparent limitation to Sabbath work situations. Indeed, the title
of the regulation section is "Observance of the Sabbath and other religious holidays." I d.
33. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) (1970).
34. The union shop provision of the NLRA provides: "Nothing in this subchapter, or
in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment
membership therein . . ." Id.
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conflict satisfactorily and resulted primarily in increased confusion.
In Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 35 for example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit balanced the governmental interest in requiring a fair sharing of collective bargaining
expenses against plaintiff's religious beliefs, upon which his refusal to pay union initiation fees and dues was based, 38 and determined that plaintiff's religious beliefs had to yield to the congressionally approved concept of the union shop. 37 The court's cursory
treatment of plaintiff's arguments, however, resulted in a judg~
ment based on the bare conclusion that the individual's interest
seemed "less substantial" than the union's interest. 38
Subsequent religious discrimination cases based on alleged
violations of the first amendment have failed to resolve the conflict, since the courts have generally refused to consider the
EEOC regulations that required the employer to make efforts to
accommodate an employee's religious beliefs. 39 The refusal of the
courts to apply EEOC regulations may have been a result of
Railway Labor Act decisions almost unanimously considering
union interests to outweigh whatever restrictions were placed on
religious beliefs. 40
Two federal district court decisions, however, have departed
from the general trend of ignoring the EEOC accommodation
requirement. In Jackson v. Veri Fresh Poultry, Inc. 41 and Dewey
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 42 the courts applied the EEOC accommodation regulations and found that the plaintiffs in each instance
had been subjected to unlawful discharge because of their
religious beliefs.
35. 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971).
36. ld. at 17.
37. ld. at 18. The panel stated: "[l]n weighing the burden which falls upon the
plaintiff if she would avoid offending her religious convictions, as against the affront which
sustaining her position would offer to the Congressionally supported principal of the union
shop, it is plaintiff who must suffer." ld.
38. ld.; see 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 291, 297-98 (1972).
39. See, e.g., Hammond v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers Union, 462 F.2d 174
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1028 (1972); Gray v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 429 F.2d 1064
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971); Comment, The "Free Exercise" Clause
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitition is No Defense to a Union Shop
Agreement Allowed Under the Railway Labor Act, 8 Hous. L. REv. 387 (1970); Comment,
Religious Observances and Discrimination in Employment, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1019,
1030 (1971).
40. See notes 9-17 and accompanying text supra.
41. 304 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. La. 1969).
42. 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd, 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), a{f'd by
an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
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Effect of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972

In 1972 Congress officially enacted the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act (EEOA) 43 in an effort to strengthen the antidiscrimination provisions of title Vll. 44 While the House of Representatives did not raise the matter of religious discrimination, the
Senate offered two amendments, 45 one of which was West Virginia
Senator Jennings Randolph's definition of religion. 46 Although
the Senator proposed his amendment to protect Sabbatarian
employees who had been discharged for their refusal to work on
Saturdays, the broad language of the amendment suggests that
Senator Randolph may have intended the application to cover
other religious beliefs. 47 Following the Senator's remarks, he included in the record the texts of two federal court decisions. 48
Each decision rejected a Sabbatarian plaintiff's claim that the
employer was in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because
the employer had failed to accommodate the plaintiff's religious
practice. Both courts also rejected the 1967 EEOC regulations
requiring an employer to accommodate employees' religious
beliefs. 49 The courts argued that Congress did not intend that
reasonable accommodations be required, and therefore failure to
do so was not contrary to the Act. 50 It is clear that Senator Ran43. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
44. Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 824, 824-25 (1972).
45. Id. at 858-61.
46. Senator Randolph offered the following as an amendment to the EEOA: "The
term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or propective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship
on the conduct of the employer's.business." 118 CoNG. REc. 705-06 (1972) (remarks of Sen.
Randolph). The amendment is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975).
47. 118 CoNa. R.Ec. 705-06 (1972).
48. Id. at 706-14. The cases to which Senator Randolph referred were Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), alf'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S.
689 (1971), and Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 464 F.2d
1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
49. Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324, 328-31 (6th Cir. 1970), alf'd by an
equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583, 58889 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
50. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla.
1971), rev'd, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972). See generally Note, Is Title VII's Reasonable
Accomodations Requirement a Law "Respecting an Establishment of Religion"?, 51
NOTRE DAME LAW. 481, 485-86 (1976).
The Randolph amendment's reasonable accomodation requirement has been challenged as violative of the establishment clause of the first amendment with disparate
results. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Cummins v. Parker
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dolph proposed his amendment precisely to show that Congress
intended to place on employers the responsibility of accommodating employee religious beliefs. 51
The passage of the amendment had a marked effect upon the
courts. For instance, in Riley v. Bendix Corp., 52 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the 1972 amendment fully validated the 1967 EEOC regulations, and since the
defendant employer had not demonstrated inability to accommodate Riley's religious practice without undue hardship to his business, Riley's discharge was unlawful under title Vll. 53
In subsequent cases the decisions generally centered on the
scope of the accommodation requirement and the interpretation
of what consituted undue hardship to the employer's business. In
many cases the courts found that there had been little or no effort
made to accommodate the employees' religious beliefs and practices. 54 Some courts focused on whether a transfer to another job
was reasonable accommodation. 55 Others found that to require
accommodation would have caused undue hardship to the
employer's business. 58 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (1975), aff'd by an equally divided court, 97 S. Ct. 342 (1976), found
that the amendment had a valid secular purpose and that its effect was to inhibit discrimination, not advance religion. /d. at 553. On the other hand, the United States District
Court for the Central District of California recently held that the amendment was a "law
respecting the establishment of religion" and therefore invalid under the first amendment.
Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 45 U.S.L.W. 2367 (Feb. 8, 1977).
51. See Note, Is Title VII's Reasonable Accomodations Requirement a Law
"Respecting an Establishment of Religion"?, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 481, 485-86 (1976).
52. 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
53. Id. at 1116-18.
54. See, e.g., Weitkenaut v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 381 F. Supp. 1284 (D. Vt.
1974); Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Ala.
1974); Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 335 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973); Liberty
Trucking Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 10 Empl. Prac.
Dec. 6258 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Sept. 24, 1975).
55. See, e.g., Draper v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1976); Dixon
v. Omaha Pub. PowerDist., 385 F. Supp.1382 (D. Neb.1974); Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum
Steel Corp., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5332 (W.D. Pa. July 1, 1975); Drum v. Ware, 7 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 7161 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 8, 1974).
56. "Undue hardship" has been found primarily in two categories of cases: (1) where
an employer has a small number of employees, making scheduling changes impossible;
e.g., Johnson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 364 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 497 F.2d 128
(5th Cir. 1974); and (2) in job situations characterized as unique. E.g., Dixon v. Omaha
Pub. Power Dist., 385 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Neb. 1974); Hardison v. Trans World Airlines,
375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 381 (1976); Kettel v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892 (E.D.
Ark. 1972). See 62 VA. L. REv. 237 (1976). But see, Reid v. Memphis Publ. Co., 369 F.
Supp. 684 (W.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd, 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct.
394 (1976); Scott v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5076 (C.D. Cal. June 15,
1973).
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Sixth Circuit, however, recently intimated that only "chaotic
personnel problems" could constitute business hardship sufficient to relieve an employer of his accommodation duty. 57
Despite the recent spate of cases that have begun to define
the parameters of the accommodation requirement, uncertainty
remains in instances where employers have claimed that a union
contract would be violated by a requirement to accommodate the
religious beliefs of employees. 58 Initially the EEOC admitted that
discharging an employee for refusing to pay union dues was not
prohibited under federal law even though the employee's conduct
was based on sincerely held religious beliefs. 59 In a 1974 decision,
however, the EEOC reversed its position, 60 which it clarified in a
1975 report:
An employer must make reasonable accommodations for employees whose religion may include observances, practices and
beliefs, ... which differ from the employer's requirements concerning standards, schedules, or other business-related employment conditions. . . .

A contract between an employer and a union will not serve
as a defense by the union to charges of unlawful discrimination.
This is true whether the contract specifically provides for an
unlawful practice or omits any procedure for processing
grievances against an unlawful practice. If an employer . . . is
required under law . . . to revise its union contract in order to
comply with the law . . . then the union involved is expected
to cooperate in the revision. 61

It is thus clear that the EEOC does not recognize union-employer
contractual agreements as valid defenses to a charge of religious
discrimination brought under title VII.
The United States' Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
recently addressed a situation where a plaintiff Seventh-day Adventist refused to join a union or to pay any dues or their equiva57. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir.1975), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 97 S. Ct. 342 (1976). See 54 TEx. L. REv. 616 (1976).
58. See, e.g., Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1974),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 381 (1976);
Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Ala. 1974);
54 TEx. L. REV. 616, 621 (1976).
59. See [1976] 1 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) ~ 237.
60. EEOC Dec. No. 74-107 (Apr. 2, 1974), [1974] 2 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) ~ 6430.
61. 81 LABOR LAW REPORT ~~ 215.2, 335 (1975), GUIDEBOOK TO FAIR EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES (1975) (emphasis added).
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lent to the union because of his religious beliefs. 82 Although the
court remanded the case for a determination of whether the employer and union could accommodate plaintiff's religious needs,
it instructed the lower court that the employee's discrimination
claim should fail if a "suggested accommodation would impose
undue hardship on the Union or on the employer's business." 83
The court seemed to imply that if any proposed accomodation of
the appellant's religious beliefs would work an undue hardship on
the employer and the union, the employee could be fired. 84
D.

The Health Care Institution Act of 1974

In 1974 Congress legislated an absolute exemption to the
union security agreement provision of the NLRA. Employees of
health care institutions who have bona fide religious objections
to joining or financially supporting any labor organization may,
in lieu of periodic dues and fees; pay equal sums to a nonreligious
charitable. fund. 85 In this legislation Congress went beyond the
Randolph amendment88 to provide an absolute exemption to
union membership or support that is not subject to the undue
hardship qualification of the amendment.
It is clear that union security agreements can be valid and
that first amendment rights may yield to such an agreement. 87
However, the Supreme Court's admission in International Association of Machinists v. Street 68 that the union shop requirements
62. Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974).
63. ld. at 403.
64. ld.; see Note, Religious Discrimination in Employment: The 1972 Amendment-A Perspective, 3 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 327, 343-44 (1975).
65. The health care institution exemption provides:
Any employee of a health care institution who is a member of and adheres
to established and traditional tenets or teachings of a bona fide religion, body,
or sect which has historically held conscientious objections to joining or financially supporting labor organizations shall not be required to join or financially
support any labor organizations as a condition of employment; except that such
an employee may be required, in lieu of periodic dues and initiation fees, to pay
sums equal to such dues and initiation fees to a nonreligious charitable fund
. . . chosen by such an employee from a list of at least three such funds, designated in a contract between such institution and a labor organization, or if the
contract fails to designate such funds, then to any such fund chosen by the
employee.
29 U.S.C. § 169 (Supp. V 1975).
66. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975). See notes
43-47 and accompany text supra.
67. See notes 9-38 and accompanying text supra; [1976] 1 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH)
~ 237.
68. 367 u.s. 740 (1961).
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are not absolutely protected and the subsequent legislation of the
Civil Rights Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, and
the Health Care Institution Act all evidence growing judicial and
legislative concern for individual religious freedom in the employment sector.
IT.

INSTANT CASE

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
the instant case had to examine the scope of the civil rights legislation to determine if relief from the union shop provision was
appropriate. The prime issue was whether the Randolph amendment, section 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act, 89 exempted the plaintiffs from the union financial support requirement within the
agency shop agreement.
In reversing the lower court's decision for the defendants, 70
the court initially recognized that it was error for the district
court to have evaluated the logic or validity of appellants' religious beliefs or practices. 71 Judges Gee and Brown rejected the
arguments for a narrow interpretation of the statute requiring
accommodation of religious beliefs. They looked to the express
language of the provision and found that "all forms and aspects
of religion, however eccentric, 72 are protected except those that
cannot be, in practice and with honest effort, reconciled with a
businesslike operation." 73 The court reviewed the history of the
provisions74 and regulations75 barring religious discrimination in
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975). See notes 43-47 and accompanying text
supra.
70. Cooperv. General Dynamics, 378 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd, 533 F.2d
163 (5th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
Hopkins, 45 U.S.L.W. 3314 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1976) (No. 76-537).
71. 533 F .2d at 166 n.4. Courts are not free to evaluate the logic or validity of religious
beliefs. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-85 (1965).
72. This language may well represent the kind of judicial overzealousness that has
been criticized. E.g., 54 TEx. L. REv. 616, 616 (1976).
73. 533 F.2d at 168-69.
74. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 states in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges or employment, because of such individual's . . . religion . . . ; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's . . . religion . . . .
(b) It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse
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employment and concluded that the broad language of the Randolph amendment resulted in a duty of accommodation.
The union argued that section 701(j) on its face only applied
to employers. Further, it was intended to apply only to Sabbath
worship, and could not be viewed as an exemption to the union
shop provision under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, due to that
section's "supremacy" clause:
Nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United
States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of
employment membership therein . . . .78

The union also argued that when Congress intended to provide
such an exemption, it did so by a narrow amendment to the
NLRA itself-the health care institution exemption. 77
The majority examined the proviso of section 8(a)(3) and
determined that it was not a "supremacy" clause, as argued by
the union, but rather was intended to function within the NLRA
itself. 78 The majority viewed Congress' recent passage of the
to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of

his . . . religion . . . or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of
his . . . religion . . . .
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization (1) . . . to
discriminate against any individual because of his . . . religion . . . (2) to limit, segregate,
or classify its membership, or applicants for membership or to classify or fail or refuse to
refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's . . . religion . . . or (3) to cause or attempt to cause
an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
75. The EEOC Religious Discrimination Guidelines provide in pertinent part:
(b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious
grounds, required by § 703(a)(l) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes an
obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to
the religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business ....
(c) Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to
hire an employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer
has the burden of proving that an undue hardship renders the required accommodations to the religious needs of the employee unreasonable.
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1975).
76. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 169 (Supp. V 1975). See notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra.
78. 533 F.2d at 169. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act gives employees
the right to engage in concerted activity or to refrain from engaging in such activity, except
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health care institution exemption, 79 without undertaking to
amend section 8(a)(3} as a condition precedent, as indicating
that Congress did not intend for the proviso to be a true "supremacy" clause that "for all time lifts section 8(a)(3) above the
general level of the United States Code to a position comparable
to the Constitution . . . . " 80
The panel differed, however, as to the scope of the accommodation duty and whether the duty should be placed on the union
as well as the employer. 81 Judge Brown, in a special concurrng
opinion, joined with Judge Rives in holding that upon remand the
lower court had to determine whether the union as well as the
employer was faced with undue hardship by virture of the accommodation requirement. 82
While agreeing with Judge Brown on the undue hardship
issue, Judge Rives dissented from the majority's extension of the
accommodation duty to include an exemption from paying union
dues under the agency shop agreement. He opined that the legislative history of the Randolph amendment83 did not evidence any
intention of amending the union shop provision to exempt
employees with religious objections from joining a labor organization or paying a dues equivalence. Since Congress had repeatedly
rejected efforts to provide exceptions to the union security provision for employees with conflicting religious convictions, 84 and yet
unanimously approved section 701 (j) as an amendment to the
"to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3)." The
proviso to section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA carves out an exception to section 8(a)(1), (2),
and (3) of the NLRA by allowing an employer and a union to contract to discriminate in
regard to union activity and terms and conditions of employment. Without the proviso to
section 8(a)(3), a union security provision in a collective bargaining agreement would,
on its face, violate section 8(a)(1) by interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees;
would violate section 8(a)(2) prohibiting an employer from "contributing financial or
other support" to a union; and would violate section 8(a)(3) because it is discrimination
in regard to the "tenure of employment." Without the proviso the union would be restraining or coercing employees in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) and would also be causing
an employer to discriminate in violation of section 8(b)(2). Brief for Appellants at 18-19.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 169 (Supp. V 1975).
80. 533 F.2d at 169.
81. Judge Gee argued that the literal language of the statute required only employers
to accommodate the reasonable religious beliefs of employees unless undue hardship was
proved. Judges Brown and Rives, however, formed a majority on this issue and determined
that upon remand, the union should be included with the employer in resolving the undue
hardship and accommodation issues. Id. at 170-71, 175.
82. Id.
83. 118 CONG. REC. 705-731 (1972).
84. Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 400 n.4 (9th Cir. 1974).
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1964 Civil Rights Act, 85 the dissent reasoned that Congress could
not have intended for that section to apply to a refusal on religious grounds to support labor unions. 86Judge Rives agreed with
the union that when Congress extended coverage of the NLRA to
employees of nonprofit hospitals, an express provision amending
section 8(a)(3) was adopted. 87 He reasoned that if the 1972
amendment to title VIJ88 required employers to accommodate
employees' religious convictions against labor unions in all circumstances, there was no need for Congress to have provided the
exemption within the Health Care Institution Act of 1974. Under
this reasoning, since Congress expressly passed the exemption, it
must not have believed that title VII already provided a possible
exemption to the agency shop provision of the NLRA for religious
beliefs. 89

ill.

ANALYSIS

The principal conflict between the majority and dissent in
the instant case was whether the broad language of the Randolph
amendment protected appellants' refusal to support the union
financially when the refusal was based on religious gounds. 90 In
attempting to resolve the conflict, the majority and dissent addressed several issues: the congressional intent of the Randolph
amendment; the significance of the proviso to section 8(a)(3) of
the NLRA; and the impact of the health care institution exemption on section 8(a)(3). Analysis of the treatment of these
arguments suggests that the majority reached a correct resolution.

A.

Congressional Intent of the Randolph Amendment

Although Judge Rives' dissent was based on the thesis that
Congress did not intend for section 701(j) to exempt employees
with opposing religious beliefs from union support, the legislative
history of the Randolph amendment yields little insight into what
Congress intended as the scope of the act. 91 While Congress had
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

118 CoNG. R.Ec. 731 (1972).
533 F.2d at 175-77.
29 U.S.C. § 169 (Supp. V 1975). See notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975).
533 F.2d at 176.
90. ld.
91. The legislative history reveals only that Senator Randolph intended for the
amendment to at least protect Sabbatarian employees from being discharged for their
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repeatedly rejected efforts to provide exceptions to union support
in order to accommodate religious principles, 92 it unanimously
approved the Randolph amendment, which stated that an effort
had to be made to accommodate employees' religious beliefs and
that all forms of religious beliefs, practices, and observances were
protected. 93
In light of such attitudes, it is apparent that Congress did not
foresee the potential conflict between the amendment and union
security agreements. Judge Rives was correct in stating that the
legislative history of the amendment does not evidence any indication of amending the union shop provision of the NLRA to
exempt employees with conflicting religious beliefs. Such a conclusion stems naturally from the fact that Congress was not considering the amendment's application to the NLRA union shop
provision. The legislative history only reveals that the amendment was meant to require employers to accommodate employees' religious beliefs and practices, at least as they related to
Sabbath observance. There is no indication that Congress considered refusals for religious reasons to pay union dues. The abbreviated legislative history does not preclude the possibility that Senator Randolph and others may have intended for the amendment
to protect religious beliefs and practices beyond Sabbath worship. Several reasons support the application of the statute to
religious practices other than Sabbath worship. Certainly the
language of the amendment is broad enough to include such beliefs and practices. 94 In addition, there does not appear to be any
valid reason for courts to protect only Sabbatarianism and not
protect other beliefs that are equally important to an individual's
free exercise of religion. 95 Finally, when faced with infringements
of first amendment religious beliefs and practices, courts ought
to extend protection-especially where the statutory language is
broad enough to do so.
refusal to work on Saturdays. 118 CONG. R.Ec. 705-31 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Randolph).
The only other indication of congressional intent is within the broad language of the
amendment itself, protecting "all aspects of religious observances and practice, as well
as belief . . . . ~·Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975).
92. See Note 84 and accompanying text supra.
93. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975).
94. The language of the amendment expressly states that "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observances and practice, as well as belief . . . . " 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975). The amendment was unanimously approved. 118 CoNG. R.Ec.
731 (1972).
95. See note 2 supra.
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Effect of the Health Care Institution Act of 1974

Judges Gee and Brown properly found that the proviso to
section 8(a)(3) was not a "supremacy" clause but instead served
a necessary function within the NLRA itself. Indeed, a close examination reveals that without the proviso to section 8(a)(3), a
union security provision in a collective bargaining agreement
would, on its face, violate at least six other sections of the
NLRA. 96
The majority and dissent differed on whether or not Congress
specifically amended section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA by enacting
the health care institution exemption. 97 When Congress extended
coverage of the NLRA to employees of nonprofit hospitals, it is
clear, as the dissent points out, that the NLRA was amended. 98
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Rives reasoned that the health
care institution exception to the NLRA was superfluous if the
Randolph amendment already required an accommodation of an
employee's religious convictions opposing union support. Since
the exemption was passed, the dissent argued, Congress must not
have believed that an exemtption already existed under titleVll.
Such a conclusion, however, does not follow as logically as
Judge Rives suggests. The accommodation requirement under
title VII is not absolute but rather may be avoided if an employer
or union99 is able to prove that the accommodation causes undue
hardship on the conduct of the business. In contrast, the exemption passed by Congress for employees of nonprofit hospitals is
absolute. Regardless of whether undue hardship on the conduct
of the business is shown, the employees may not be forced to join
or financially support the union. The fact that Congress did not
mention the 1972 Randolph amendment follows logically from the
realization that Congress was not interested in a qualified exemption but rather in an absolute one. Of importance is the fact that
the reason Congress was interested in such a blanket exemption
from union support was "to protect the beliefs of Seventh Day
Adventists operating forty-seven hospitals and nursing homes
96. See note 78 supra.
97. 533 F .2d at 169, 176.
98. 533 F .2d at 176. The NLRA was amended by the Health Care Institution Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 93-360, § 3, 88 Stat. 395-97 (1974).
99. Although the amendment on its face only requires the employer to accommodate
his employees' religious beliefs and practices, courts both in Yott v. North Am. Rockwell
Corp., 501 F .2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974), and in the instant case have included the union
with the employer in the determination of the accommodation and undue hardship
issues.
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across the country." 100 In view of congressional concern manifested for the religious principles of a large group, it is not unreasonable to infer a similar concern, on a qualified basis, for individuals such as the appellants in the instant case.
C.

Mandatory Dues and Undue Hardship

It is understandable that unions generally are not pleased
with exceptions to their membership requirements; such exceptions may weaken their bargaining position. On the other hand,
religious freedom is expressly protected by the first amendment.
In Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp., 101 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the union
and employer had a duty to accommodate the appellant's
religious opposition to union financial support. 102 The court intimated, however, that allowing the plaintiff not to pay union dues
would meet the test of undue hardship. 103 Thus, the Ninth Circuit's decision merely paid lip service to the accommodation requirement. The court essentially determined that a de minimus
inconvenience to a union and employer outweighed an individual's bona fide religious beliefs.
The appellants in the instant case placed a union dues equivalence in trust to be given to a nonreligious charity. 104 This arrangement is similar to that required by Congress under the
health care institution exemption. 105 Other employers and unions
have similarly permitted employees whose religious objections
barred their payment of money to a union to pay an equivalent
amount to a charitable organization. 106 In fact, the AFL-CIO officially recommended such a policy to its unions and affiliates in
1965. 107 Under such an arrangement, appellants do not get a "free
100. Brief for Appellants at 28 (quoting Daily Labor Report No. 106 of the Bureau of
National Affairs (May 31, 1974)).
101. 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974).
102. Id.
103. ld. at 403.
104. Brief for Appellants at 7, 8.
105. Health Care Institution Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 169 (Supp. V 1975).
106. BrieHor Appellants at 27; see Comment, Religious Observances and Discrimination in Employment, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1019, 1042-43 (1971).
107. The AFL-CIO urged its union and affiliates to: "(1) Immediately adopt procedures for respecting sincere personal religious convictions as to union membership and
activities; and (2) Undertake to insure that this policy is fully and sympathetically implemented by all local unions." Statement of the AFL-CIO Executive Council On Union
Membership and Religious Objections, Sept. 20, 1965 (quoted in Brief for Appellants at
23).
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ride," and certainly no other employee would be tempted to use
claimed religious objections to mask any desire to avoid payment
of dues and fees to the union. In light of congressional approval
of such a program in the health care institution exemption, and
union and judicial approval in other areas, it does not appear that
such an arrangement would work an undue hardship on the employer or union.
There can be no question that the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, and the Health
Care Institution Act of 1974 all evidence increasing concern for
individual religious rights in the employment field. The health
care institution exemption especially has extensive ramifications
for future instances of refusals for religious reasons to support
unions. It represents a sensible compromise between the strong
policies supporting both union security provisions and religious
freedom. In light of this legislation, the court's application of the
Randolph amendment to safeguard appellants' religious beliefs in
the instant case is a reasonable extension of congressionally approved protection.

